














DIGITAL DATA AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: 
THE BIPARTISAN SOLUTION 




The advent of digital technology created a slew of problems in applying 
the Fourth Amendment. In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken a 
more active approach in addressing the interaction between the Fourth 
Amendment and digital technologies. Two perspectives have emerged 
for justifying Fourth Amendment protections: one privacy-based and 
the other property-based.  
 
The two approaches need not be mutually exclusive. This paper suggests 
a method to bridge the ideological divide in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence by combining the property and privacy perspectives into 
a unified test. This paper further suggests reforms that can be made to 
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine to return it to its ideological roots 
and facilitate the protection of digital data. 
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Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has taken an interest in 
reexamining Fourth Amendment doctrine in a variety of different 
contexts as digital technology evolves.2 The doctrine established in 
United States v. Miller3 and Smith v. Maryland4 during the late 1970s, 
known as the “third-party doctrine,” has proven inadequate in protecting 
the privacy rights of Americans in the digital sphere.5 The third-party 
doctrine states that content voluntarily disclosed to a third party for the 
third party’s use does not receive Fourth Amendment protections.6  
 
The concept of the third-party doctrine stems from an application of the 
precedent established in Katz v. United States, which states that Fourth 
Amendment protections only extend to circumstances where a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.7 The logic underpinning the 
Smith and Miller decisions is that information willingly shared with 






2 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 
(2014), Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
3 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
4 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
5 See, e.g., Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH. L. 
REV. 1441 (2017); Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party 
Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 985 (2016); Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the 
Internet Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH 1 
(2017). In general, commentators have pointed out that the third-party doctrine, which is based 
on the technological paradigms of late 20th century American, has been overly broad and 
simplistic in its approach to digital technology.  
6 See Steven E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third 
Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 437-38 (2013).  
7 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan’s concurrence outlines a 
two-prong test that has seen wide application since Katz. Fourth Amendment protections will 
be given if: (1) the individual had a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) that expectation 
of privacy was an expectation that society would deem reasonable. Id.  
8 See Smith, 442 U.S. 735; Miller, 425 U.S. 435. 
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Almost all modern communications require the use of third parties to 
function.9 Every facet of American social and financial life conducted 
via the internet or over the phone including social media, banking, 
investment, dating, and retail is operated, managed, and recorded by 
third parties.10 Yet, despite the massive amount of sensitive, personal 
information contained on these platforms, the Fourth Amendment 
affords those data essentially zero protection merely because they are 
held by third parties.11  
 
The third-party doctrine, as applied to the internet and similar digital 
technologies, presents a major interpretive problem. Since internet 
architecture functions almost exclusively through the usage of third 
parties, vast amounts of data are often shared with third parties without 
the knowledge or explicit consent of the end user, which makes applying 
an analysis under the Smith and Miller framework practically 
unworkable.12 Over the last decade, a majority of the Court13 has 
gradually come to the conclusion that the current form of the third-party 
doctrine can no longer be reasonably maintained with regards to digital 
technology.14 At the same time, however, the Court has not offered any 
substantial guidance as to what will replace the third-party doctrine, nor 
has the Court diminished its value as precedent.  
 
In the most recent of these cases, Carpenter v. United States, the Court 





9 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (2002).  
10 Id.  
11 See Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 5, at 986.  
12 See Bellovin et al., supra note 5, at 3. 
13 Almost all Justices on the current Court disapprove of the third-party doctrine to some 
extent but differ as to the degree and the reasoning behind the disapproval. See generally, 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). The only Justices on the current Court 
whose opinion is not definitively known are Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett. See id. 
(Kavanaugh and Barrett were not on the Court at the time of Carpenter and have not yet 
issued an opinion on a major Fourth Amendment case).  
14 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 400-01 (2014) (rejecting a “pre-digital” analogy test 
and the application of Smith to be of limited use when determining the government’s 
accessibility to digital records). The Court acknowledged that “[m]odern cell phones are not 
just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they 
hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” Id. at 403.  
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Location Information (“CSLI”).15 Cell phones are designed to 
continuously look for the nearest “cell-site”—essentially a radio 
antennae meant to connect the phone to wireless services—and produce 
CSLI when the phone connects to a cell-site, which timestamps the 
phone’s geographic location in order to perform a variety of functions.16 
The Court described CSLI as a “distinct category of information” that 
was not covered by the third-party doctrine.17   
 
Carpenter has caused a major debate and uncertainty in the current 
status of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence about the current status of 
the third-party doctrine. In addition, the decision has called into question 
the continued applicability of the Katz v. United States18 reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test 
provides the underlying framework for the third-party doctrine.19 While 
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority in Carpenter, stated that the 
decision did not “disturb the application of Smith and Miller,”20 the 
general consensus among academics, and even other members of the 
Court, is that the third-party doctrine is on “life support.”21 
Consequently, the status of the third-party doctrine and the Fourth 





15 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210 (describing the grounds on which the Court distinguishes 
Cell-Site Location Information from the information in Smith and Miller).  
16 Id. at 2211-12. 
17 Id. at 2219. The Court, emphasizing how much technology has changed, further states that 
“[t]here is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed 
in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by 
wireless carriers today.” Id.  
18 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
19 See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357 
(2019); Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the 
Evolving Fourth Amendment, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79 (2018); Sarah A. Mezera, Note, 
Carpenter’s Legacy: Limiting the Scope of the Electronic Private Search Doctrine, 117 MICH. 
L. REV. 1487 (2019); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
20 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210.  
21 Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing 
Carpenter as “fracturing two fundamental pillars of Fourth Amendment law” and 
“transform[ing] Smith and Miller into an unprincipled and unworkable doctrine.”); Ohm, 
supra note 19; Michael Gentithes, The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity Can Categorize 
Third-Party Data After Carpenter, 53 GA. L. REV. 1039 (2019).  
22 Academics have criticized the Court’s lack of citation of legal scholarship in Carpenter that 
could potentially provide guidance for understanding its central holding. See Ohm, supra note 
19, at 370. Ohm further notes that the decision in Carpenter resembles a version of a test 




As Justice Sotomayor first noted in United States v. Jones, the Court 
needed to “reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties.”23 The Court has yet to come to an articulable and clear set of 
principles with regards to this “privacy regime” to supplement Katz in 
the realm of digital data. However, some academics, such as 
Georgetown Law Professor Paul Ohm, have speculated that Carpenter 
may completely supplant not only Smith and Miller but also Katz itself, 
and thus create an entirely new doctrine.24 This new perspective on 
Fourth Amendment analysis, which Ohm characterizes as the 
“Carpenter test,” creates a new three-prong evaluation which evaluates 
whether the category of information (1) has a deeply revealing nature; 
(2) possesses depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach; and (3) results 
from an inescapable and automatic form of data collection.25 Even if 
Carpenter has not created a new test, the Court generally is trending 
toward being more inclusive of recognizing a Fourth Amendment 
interest in digital data and restricting the applicability of Smith and 
Miller to digital data.26 
 
Others have noted that while the discussion regarding the fate of the 





proposed by Susan Freiwald, but the Court does not indicate whether it was aware of the 
Freiwald’s test when deciding Carpenter. Id. For an in-depth discussion on Freiwald’s test, see 
Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, 
Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681 (2011).  
23 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
24 Ohm, supra note 19, at 378. Ohm gives several examples of what he speculates to be 
covered under this new test. Data likely to be covered under the Carpenter test includes 
information such as web browsing records and massive collections of telephone and banking 
records. Id. at 378-84. Ohm speculates that genetic information and medical information may 
be protected, but that their future is less certain with his proposed test. Id. at 378-85.  
25 Id. at 370. Ohm acknowledges there is likely to be significant disagreement about what 
factors Carpenter implies given the broad nature of the Court’s opinion. Id. Consequently, it is 
important to consider Ohm’s formulation as a test on a more conceptual level and as an 
articulation of potentially protectable principles rather than a definitive test.  
26 Id. at 358 (stating that Carpenter “has been heralded as a milestone for the protection of 
privacy in an age of rapidly changing technology”).  
27 The current majority on this issue consists of Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices 
Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan. See generally id. Justice Kavanaugh has not articulated a clear 
position with regards to his perspective on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence either on the 
Supreme Court or in his previous position on the D.C. Circuit Court. See Orin Kerr, Judge 
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minority, comprised of Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito, has 
attempted to reinvigorate the “property-based regime” conceived prior 
to the Katz test.28 These Justices consider whether the subject of the 
search is part of the individual’s “person, house, papers, and effects”29 
to determine whether the subject enjoys Fourth Amendment 
protection.30 While Justice Thomas and Justice Alito have denied that 
digital data held by third parties belongs to the individual whose 
information is contained on said data,31 Justice Gorsuch has been more 
willing to recognize that one’s digital data could be considered their 
“papers and effects.”32 Justice Gorsuch’s willingness to break rank with 
his peers and extend Fourth Amendment protections to digital data is 
further indicia that the Court as a whole is increasingly considering 






Kavanaugh on the Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (July 20, 2018, 6:16 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/judge-kavanaugh-on-the-fourth-amendment/ 
[https://perma.cc/RCT8-FEBR]. Kerr warns against reading too much into Justice 
Kavanaugh’s prior rulings given his “modest” record. Nonetheless, there is some indication 
that Justice Kavanaugh may harbor sympathies for both the majority and conservative 
minority regarding this issue. See United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 769-71 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(order denying rehearing) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Justice Barrett’s opinion is also not yet 
known.  
28 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2235 (2018) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (stating 
that the “Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals a right to be secure from unreasonable 
searches of ‘their persons, houses, papers and effects’”); Id. at 2240 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(stating “the organizing constitutional idea of the founding era . . . was property.”; Id. at 2267-
68 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (explaining that “the traditional approach asked if a house, paper 
or effect was yours under law. No more was needed to trigger the Fourth Amendment”). 
Justice Thomas explicitly disapproved of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, 
calling it a “failed experiment.” Id. at 2246 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
30 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2267-68 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting); id. at 2257 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
31 Id. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[The defendant] did not create the records, he d[id] 
not maintain them, and he cannot destroy them. Neither the terms of his contracts nor any 
provision of law makes the records his. The records belong to [the third party.]”); id. at 2257 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that “[there is] no right to demand the [third party] destroy 
the records, no right to prevent the providers from destroying the records . . . to modify the 
records . . . [and] no meaningful control over the [records] which are [managed] by [the third 
party.]”).  
32 Id. at 2268-69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (explaining that the mere fact that a third party has 
“access to or possession of your papers and effects does not necessarily limit your interest in 
them” and further describing how the concept of bailment could potentially be applied to 
digital data).  
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As Justice Gorsuch acknowledges, the property-based regime does not 
extinguish the Katz privacy regime, and the two doctrines can exist 
concurrently.33 The Katz privacy regime does not abridge the expressly 
enumerated rights found in the Fourth Amendment itself, and the 
property-based regime does not preclude a Katz analysis from being 
conducted. Consequently, a bipartisan doctrinal answer may be possible 
in the wake of Carpenter, as the current Court seems to be protective of 
digital privacy rights and trending toward a more inclusive 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment from both a privacy and 
property-based perspective.  
 
This Note discusses the two types of philosophical underpinnings of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the property-based perspective and 
the Katz privacy perspective. In Part II, the Note will explore the history 
and development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to distill the 
essence of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into a set of articulable 
principles. Part III will explore the development of the current precedent 
in detail and illustrate how Smith and Miller have decoupled Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence from both the privacy and property 
perspective’s philosophical interests. Part IV bridges the gap between 
the property-based regime and the privacy regime to create a bipartisan, 
technology inclusive doctrine that favors the private individual to 
govern digital technology moving forward. Part V concludes.  
 
II. Legal History 
 
Privacy and property rights have always been essential principles 
underpinning Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.34 For a time, however, 
the Fourth Amendment was thought to protect only tangible property 
seized from a constitutionally protected area, such as one’s person or 





33 Id. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018) 
(“Katz supplements, rather than displaces ‘the traditional property-based understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment’”)).  
34 See, e.g., ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (describing the importance of the 
“secrecy of letters”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (stating that the 
Fourth Amendment was thought to limit seizures of only tangible property).  
35 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (holding that only a physical invasion of 
the home or seizure of tangible material effects enjoyed Fourth Amendment protection). But 
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midway through the Twentieth Century, the Court began to reassess its 
position and the foundation of the Fourth Amendment in property 
principles.36 By the latter half of the Twentieth Century, the privacy 
perspective of the Fourth Amendment began to dominate the 
jurisprudence, culminating with Katz explicitly rebuking the exclusively 
property-based perspective.37 However, the implementation of an 
unfettered privacy perspective in Katz has led to strange results and 
doctrinal issues such as the third-party doctrine established in Smith and 
Miller that undermine the intention of the Fourth Amendment’s 
underlying principles. 
 
A. Ex Parte Jackson: Where All Roads Lead Back To 
 
Ex parte Jackson revolves around a relatively simple set of facts. 
Despite its simplicity, Jackson is exceptionally valuable for 
understanding the principles underpinning the vast majority of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Jackson provides an exemplary case study 
in how the Court treats different categories of information.  
 
In 1877, A. Orlando Jackson had been convicted for illegally circulating 
a flier concerning a lottery through the U.S. Postal Service.38 Congress 
had previously declared in 1868 that attempting to send mail concerning 
lotteries was unlawful.39 Despite this, Jackson attempted to send his 





see, JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (P. Laslett, ed. 2002) (describing a 
theory of property that creates a property interest in not only tangible objects, but also in 
labor); JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE INVENTION OF AMERICA 78 
(2010) (explaining that the Lockean idea of property did not only encompass tangible objects, 
but also the rights to acquire tangible objects as the result of one’s labor).  
36 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1962) (holding that intangible 
communications could be improperly seized and were subject to the exclusionary rule).   
37 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“But the premise that property interests control the right of the 
Government to search and seize has been discredited”). The Court has repeatedly stated that 
the Fourth Amendment does not only extend to the seizure of tangible items. Id.  
38 Jackson, 96 U.S. at 728.  
39 Id. at 730.  
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otherwise.40 Jackson appealed his conviction as unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds.41 The appeal was unsuccessful.42 
 
While the Court upheld Congress’ right to regulate mail, it also 
articulated a clear standard for what types of personal property were 
protected under the Fourth Amendment and how inspection should be 
handled.43 The Court widened the scope of the Fourth Amendment to 
protect items outside of a person’s home, such as their papers and 
effects, but only under certain circumstances.44 To this effect, the Court 
stated: 
 
[A] distinction is to be made . . . between what is 
intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, 
and sealed packages . . . and what is open to inspection, 
such as . . . [mail] purposely left in a condition to be 
examined. [Mail] of this kind in the mail are fully 
guarded . . . except as to their outward form and weight, 
as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them 





40 Id. at 737. The Court noted that the circular was “left open for examination.” Id. The Court 
notes in the syllabus that the mail was “enclosed in an envelope,” yet from the language of the 
court and holding of the case, it can be inferred that the circular was still visible despite being 
in an envelope. See id. at 728. The Court does not describe how or why the circular was 
visible to the postal inspectors, however.  
41 Id. at 730. Jackson’s original petition did not contemplate a Fourth Amendment remedy, but 
the Court nonetheless analyzed the seizure of his mail under the Fourth Amendment, along 
with his First Amendment claim.  
42 Id. at 737. The Court denied the First Amendment petition on the grounds that Congress had 
the enumerated authority to regulate the mail and had the right to “refuse its facilities for the 
distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals.” Id. at 736.  
43 Id. at 733. The standard originating in Jackson is often termed the “content/envelope” or 
“content/non-content” distinction by academics. Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope 
Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2112 (2009). This distinction is 
not only present in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but also statutory law regarding 
electronic surveillance. Id.; see also Bellovin et al., supra note 5, at 12. In the context of 
internet and digital technologies, however, the distinction has repeatedly come under criticism 
as being inapplicable and creating impractical, unworkable doctrines. See Bellovin et al., 
supra note 5, at 20-22.  
44 Burrus & Knight, supra note 19, at 82 (describing how Jackson did not impose a location 
requirement on whether a person’s papers or effects are covered by the Fourth Amendment).  
45 Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733. The “outward form and weight” of the letter forms the basis of 
what is traditionally considered to be “non-content,” whereas the letter itself is considered 
“content.” See Tokson, supra note 43, at 2112. The Court highlights the importance that the 




The main principle expressed by the Court is clear: Unless the mail was 
sent in a manner that plainly revealed its contents, it will generally enjoy 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment as a person’s “papers and 
effects” except as to what is plainly visible from its “outward form and 
weight.”46  
 
The principle intuitively makes sense. Postal inspectors and the police 
should not willfully blind themselves to what is plainly visible. For 
physical mail to function, one must read the writing on the envelope to 
know where it is headed, how much a package weighs, and what it looks 
like. Subjecting such information to Fourth Amendment scrutiny would 
make running the postal service without a constitutional violation all but 
impossible.  
 
Another principle not explicitly stated in the opinion, but which can be 
felt underlying its reasoning, is the expectation of privacy that would be 
further developed and formally recognized in Katz.47 The same line of 
thought would later be used to develop the third-party doctrine in Miller 
and Smith.48 The sender of the letter that knows certain information (i.e. 
its exterior) will be seen by the government as a practical matter—the 





“outward form and weight” is a property of the evidence that is “seen by everyone, and is in 
its nature conclusive.” Jackson, 96 U.S. at 736.  
46 Jackson, 96 U.S. at 736. The Court clarifies that “no difficulty arises, and no principle is 
violated, in excluding the prohibited items or refusing to forward them” in circumstances 
where “the object is exposed, and shows unmistakably that it is prohibited.” Id.  
47 The Court in Jackson notes that people have a constitutional right in papers “closed against 
inspection, wherever they may be” and that Congress may not “invade the secrecy of letters.” 
Id. at 733. The significance the Court places on whether the person has actively concealed 
their papers from inspection implies an expectation of privacy that otherwise is not contained 
in the literal language of the Fourth Amendment, which makes no such distinction between 
concealment and public display of papers. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967).  
48 See Burrus & Knight, supra note 19, at 81. Similar to how Jackson does not afford Fourth 
Amendment protections to information visible to a government agent (i.e., the postage 
officer), Smith and Miller stand for the contention that information turned over to a third party 
for the third party’s use carries no Fourth Amendment protections. Information that a third 
party is expected to view or use does not enjoy privacy protections. See id.  
49 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the subjecting reasonableness 
requirement to enjoy Fourth Amendment protections).  
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understands and consents to the fact that the information on the envelope 
will be read and its container scrutinized but considers the contents of 
the letter itself to be private. Hence, the contents are protected under the 
Fourth Amendment. In the words of the Court, the letter’s “contents” 
are to be treated as “papers subject to search in one’s own household.”50 
 
B. Olmstead, Wong Sun, and Berger: Protecting 
“Intangible” Communications 
 
While Jackson protected physical property—such as letters—prior to 
the 1967 Berger v. State of N.Y.51 case, the Court had not recognized 
similar protections for communications via telephone.52 The Court ruled 
in Olmstead v. United States that wiretapping did not amount to a search 
or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.53 The Court would not 
acknowledge the government’s seizure of communications as 
constitutionally protected until Wong Sun54 and would not apply it in a 
surveillance context until Berger.55 
 
1. Olmstead v. United States: An Inspirational Dissent 
 
The Court’s decision in Olmstead rejecting any constitutional protection 
against wiretapping came from a narrow interpretation of the holding in 
Jackson: wiretapping a telephone neither seized any tangible effects or 
papers nor invaded a “constitutionally protected area” (e.g. residence or 
place of business).56 Telephone wires extended beyond the home, and 
nonphysical communications—which were not papers or effects—
intercepted via a device placed outside the home of suspects were not 





50 Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733. 
51 388 U.S. 41 (1967).  
52 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).  
53 Id. 
54 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). 
55 Berger, 388 U.S. at 63.  
56 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. Although all communications have some physical properties to 
them and potentially can be manifested in a permanent, physical form, the Court did not 
consider verbal communications sufficiently tangible to constitute a person’s “effects.” See id.  
57 Id. The wiretaps used in Olmstead were placed in the telephone wires that ran throughout 
the streets near the defendant’s houses. Id. at 456-57.   




In his now-famous dissent, which later informed a slew of decisions, 
including Berger and Carpenter,58 Justice Brandeis expressed his 
concern over the “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching methods of invading 
privacy” available to the government that were “more effective than 
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is 
whispered in the closet.”59 Disputing the Court’s interpretation of 
Jackson, Brandeis argued that there was no legal difference between a 
private telephone conversation and a sealed letter.60 The invasion of 
privacy was far greater by wiretapping than by tampering with the mail, 
as it implicated not only more sensitive information but also multiple 
individuals.61 
 
Through a wiretap, the government could obtain a much greater volume 
of confidential and private information about an individual than by mail. 
Brandeis described traditional means of espionage as “but puny 
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire 
tapping.”62 Speaking on the intentions and principles of the Framers, 
Brandeis noted that the Fourth Amendment protects against 
unjustifiable intrusion by the government regardless of the means.63 
Whether the information seized was “tangible” or not had no bearing. 
 
Brandeis’ broader interpretation of the Fourth Amendment eventually 
became the backbone underlying Wong Sun v. United States, Berger, 
and, finally, Katz, which directly overturned Olmstead and created an 






58 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 
473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). The Court in Carpenter acknowledges the profound 
influence Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead has had on shaping Fourth Amendment discourse. Id.  
59 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
60 Id. Brandeis goes on further to note that “in the application of a Constitution, our 
contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but what may be.” Id.  
61 Id. at 475-76. Brandeis articulates that the purpose behind the Fourth Amendment is not 
merely meant as a defense against the invasion of physical property, but also an “indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.” Id. 
62 Id. at 476. Brandeis’ concerns not only reflect his reservations about the wiretap 
specifically, but of all future surveillance technology developments. See id.  
63 Id. at 478. 
64 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  




2. Wong Sun v. United States: The Unexpected Surveillance 
Case 
 
Wong Sun v. United States, a case completely unrelated to wiretapping, 
had a massive impact in redefining the Court’s approach to the Fourth 
Amendment and, by extension, government surveillance.65 Previously, 
in cases such as Silverman v. United States66 and Goldman v. United 
States,67 the Court had declined to upend the precedent established by 
Olmstead and narrowly construed the Fourth Amendment to tangible 
objects.68 Neither Goldman nor Silverman affected the central holding 
of Olmstead, but Silverman managed to slightly shift the conversation. 
Silverman stood for the general idea that a physical intrusion into a  
“constitutional protected area” was an unwarranted search, and it 
prohibited the use of the observed communications, but it did not focus 
on whether the taking of the communications was a “seizure.”69 The 
Court’s finding in Silverman was nonetheless a small but significant 
departure from Olmstead, as the exclusionary rule traditionally barred 







65 See generally 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding that communication is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment).  
66 See 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (holding that a “spike mike” attached to the heating duct of 
defendant’s home was a search).  
67 See 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (holding that a detectaphone placed in a room adjoining the office 
of defendant was not a search under the Fourth Amendment and explicitly declining to 
overturn Olmstead).  
68 The articulable distinction between Silverman and Goldman was that although both 
involved government surveillance efforts, only in Silverman did the device physically enter 
the home, and therefore was prohibited. See Silverman, 365 U.S. 505. By contrast, Goldman 
involved a device placed outside of the defendant’s residence, and therefore was considered 
permissible. See Goldman, 316 U.S. 129.  
69 See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512. (Stewart, J., writes “it is based upon the reality of an actual 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”). Silverman reflects the first time that the 
Court has decided to exclude oral statements observed via an invalid search.  
70 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485 (discussing the impact of Silverman on the Court’s holding 
and the lack of meaningful distinction between verbal and “physical” evidence for the 
purposes of the exclusionary rule). The Court in Silverman did not attempt to reconcile the 
logical contradiction of barring Fourth Amendment protections to oral communications (i.e., 
there were not objects that could be improperly seized) yet still preventing them from being 
introduced in Court when obtained in an improper search.  
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With Wong Sun, the paradigm would shift, and the Fourth Amendment 
would protect against the seizure of verbal statements by 
“eavesdropping” law enforcement.71 While semantically the term 
“eavesdropping” may seem to imply the use of surveillance technology, 
the facts of Wong Sun involve no devices other than the human ear.72 
Federal narcotics agents had unlawfully entered the residence of James 
Wah Toy under the suspicion that he had been selling heroin.73 Upon 
entering Toy’s home, the agents detained and interrogated Toy, who 
stated that, while he did not sell heroin, he knew a man named Johnny 
who did.74 Agents found a man by the name of Johnny Yee, who 
surrendered a small amount of heroin and stated that he got it from 
another man, Wong Sun.75  
 
The Court threw out Toy’s statements under the doctrine of fruit of the 
poisonous tree.76 In the Court’s view, the Fourth Amendment 
safeguarded “verbal statements as well as the more traditional seizure of 
‘papers and effects.’”77 While still in the context of an unlawful physical 
intrusion by law enforcement, the formal recognition of speech as the 
equivalent of “papers and effects” changed Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence to include non-tangible information. Brandeis, for the 









71 Id. at 486. 
72 Id. at 474. 
73 Id. Federal agents had broken into Toy’s laundry service (where he also lived) following an 
exchange wherein Toy slammed the door after an agent identified himself as a narcotics 
officer and fled from the business area of the laundromat to his living quarters. Id. In response, 
the agents broke down the door to pursue Toy. Id. The agents did not have a warrant when 
they entered Toy’s residence. Id.  
74 Id. The amount of heroin surrendered was less than one ounce. Id.  
75 Id. at 475. Through a convoluted series of events, Johnny Yee identified Wong Sun by his 
nickname, “Sea Dog” and the narcotics agents had to return to Toy to interrogate him a second 
time to find out that “Sea Dog” was Wong Sun. Id.  
76 Id. at 485. The fruit of the poisonous tree prohibits the introduction of illegally obtained 
evidence. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (coining the phrase “fruit of the 
poisonous tree”).  
77 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485.The Court logically inferred this distinction from Silverman, 
stating that verbal and physical evidence were both “fruits” of an invalid search. Id.  
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3. Berger v. New York: Overturning Olmstead 
 
Berger took the principles from Wong Sun and applied them to the 
context of electronic surveillance.78 Specifically, the Court ruled that 
statutes authorizing eavesdropping had to be construed to meet the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.79 Failure to adhere to the 
warrant requirement would bar the “fruit” or communications obtained 
by wiretap or bug.80 Echoing Brandeis’s dissent from Olmstead, the 
Court noted that “[f]ew threats to liberty exist which are greater than 
that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices.”81 
 
The holding of Berger overturned Olmstead sub silentio.82 A wiretap 
capturing conversations, even if physically affixed outside of a 
constitutionally protected area, constituted a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.83 Under the Court’s construction, a wiretap 
did invade the privacy of one’s home.84  
 
But what about wiretaps or other surveillance devices that record people 
outside of their homes? For better or worse, the issue had still been 
couched in the “constitutionally protected area” language established in 
Olmstead.85 Since the Court in Berger framed the issue in terms of 





78 See Berger v. N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1966). Berger specifically concerned a New York statute 
authorizing law enforcement to eavesdrop via electronic surveillance with “reasonable 
grounds.” Id. at 51. The Court noted that “the law, though jealous of individual privacy, has 
not kept pace with [advances in surveillance technology.]” Id. at 49.  
79 Id. at 63. The Court additionally provided a common law basis against eavesdropping 
generally, noting that it was historically recognized as a nuisance. Id. at 45. The Court 
criticized the state as allowing officers “a roving commission to ‘seize’ any and all 
conversations.” Id. at 59.  
80 Id. at 63.  
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 64 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court at no point in the majority opinion directly 
states that it is overturning Olmstead (in other words, it overturned Olmstead sub silentio), but 
Justice Douglas immediately highlights this fact in his concurrence. Id.  
83 Id. at 51 (majority opinion). Notably, the Court considered a wiretap, even if physically 
affixed outside the home or office, a “trespassory invasion.” Id. at 64.  
84  Id. at 51. 
85 Even though the Court had gone to great lengths to establish the “basic right to privacy” in 
Berger, that privacy only extended to “one’s home” and did not encompass other interactions 
outside the home (or constitutionally protected areas), no matter how sensitive or “private” 
they might be. See id. at 63.  
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question of what Fourth Amendment protections existed for a person 
being surveilled outside the home during his or her everyday life 
remained.  
 
That question would be answered in Katz, which would completely 
redefine the standards under which the Fourth Amendment would be 
governed. 
 
C. Katz Changes Everything 
 
Charles Katz was indicted for gambling by placing wager information 
using a public telephone booth.86 At his trial, the Government 
introduced evidence collected by FBI agents via a wiretap placed on the 
booth, and Katz was convicted.87 Katz appealed, arguing that the 
wiretap violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and the Court agreed.88  
 
The Court in Katz stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places.”89 Citing Jackson, among other things,  the Court noted that 
what a person intended to keep private, even in areas accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.90 Conversely, what is 
knowingly exposed to the public, even when within a private home or 
office, does not enjoy Fourth Amendment protections.91 The latter 
principle would become part of the foundation of the third-party 






86 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
87 Id.  
88 Id. The Court specifically rejected Katz’ formulation of the issue, which he based on 
whether a telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area, stating “the correct solution 
of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by the incantation of the phrase 
‘constitutionally protected area.’” Id. at 350.  
89 Id. at 351.  
90 Id. (“[W]hat [the individual] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.”). 
91 Id. For example, a person has no privacy interest in acts that they perform that are visible 
from an unobstructed window in his or her home, even it is technically within a “private” 
location. See id.  
92 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 
(1976). 
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While Berger retained most of the legal framework of protection from 
invasion of constitutionally protected areas from Olmstead, the Court in 
Katz functionally abandoned this idea.93 Explicitly overturning 
Olmstead, the Court concluded that Fourth Amendment protections do 
not turn on “the presence or absence of physical intrusion into any given 
enclosure.”94 Instead, the new consideration for whether the Fourth 
Amendment applied would be centered around a more nebulous 
conceptualization of privacy,95 which was not meaningfully analyzed in 
the Court’s ruling.96  
 
While the rebuke of Olmstead was significant, the most important and 
enduring component of Katz did not come from the majority’s opinion 
but rather from Justice Harlan’s concurrence.97 The explanation of 
principles in Harlan’s concurrence would lead to the creation of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test.98 The test featured two prongs to 
establish Fourth Amendment protection: (1) that a person exhibited an 
actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that the expectation is 






93 Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test, 40 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 6 (2009). The Court noted the Fourth Amendment “protected individual 
privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and 
often have nothing to do with privacy at all.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.  
94 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
95 The majority opinion in Katz provides a major shift in perspective on how Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence should be handled from the more traditionalist property-based 
perspective to a privacy-based perspective, which has a more indefinite and broader approach 
than the previously used property-based perspective.  See generally id. Even though Katz 
shifts the focus, it is important to note that Katz was not intended to diminish the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope of protection, not constrain the Fourth Amendment to solely a privacy 
perspective. See id. at 350 (stating that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a general right 
to privacy and is not limited to merely privacy rights).  
96 See generally id. (Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, does not provide details for what 
a reasonable expectation of privacy is).  
97 Winn, supra note 93, at 7. It is widely acknowledged that Justice Harlan’s concurrence has 
overridden the majority opinion in terms of relevance. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (describing Justice Harlan’s “oft-quoted concurrence”); Minnesota v. 
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (stating that the Katz test refers exclusively to Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
98 Winn, supra note 93. 
99 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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The principles expressed under Katz harken back to the concepts first 
espoused in Jackson. Much like how a person cannot have a reasonable 
expectation that writing on an envelope’s exterior would go unread, 
“conversations in the open would not be protected against being 
overheard.”100 Through Katz, the principles and expectations set forth in 
Jackson were finally incorporated for communication and expression.  
But what happens when the communications are monitored or recorded 
by non-government third parties? Katz clearly establishes that 
communication is equivalent to one’s papers and effects, both of which 
require a warrant to be seized.101 But Katz says nothing about 
communications retained by third parties. 
 
Surveillance statutes following Katz, such as Title III of the 1968 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act102 (hereinafter “Wiretap 
Act”), provided strong protections for the “contents” of any wire, 
electronic, or oral communication intercepted by government 
devices.103 Contents were defined as “any information concerning the 
substance, purport, or meaning” of that communication.104 The Wiretap 
Act only protected communication being “intercepted” by government 
devices, which provided no barrier to prevent the government from 
obtaining information held by third parties.105 
 
D. Miller and Smith: Third-Party Doctrine Muddies the 
Water 
 
The beginnings of a doctrine that would perplex and dismay modern 





100 Id. The language used here can be seen as analogous to the “outward form and weight” 
language employed in Jackson. See ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).  
101 See 389 U.S. at 358-59. 
102 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, PUB L. NO. 90-351, §§2510-2520, 82 Stat. 
197, 211-25 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C §§ 2510-2530 (2012)).  
103 18 U.S.C § 2510(8) (original definition of “contents” from the Wiretap Act).  
104 Id. Records maintained by third parties regarding phone calls were not considered to be 
“content” for the purposes of this definition. Id.  
105 Id. The distinction between “intercepted” and “held” in this case refers to the transitory 
nature of the information. Under the Wiretap Act, the government was restrained from 
actively listening to an ongoing conversation. See id. However, the government was not 
restricted from seizing a transcript of a conversation being held in storage by a third party 
under the Wiretap Act. See id.  
2021] MCCUTCHEON 295 
 
 
Smith.106 Other cases had previously addressed disclosures to third 
parties, such as Lopez v. United States107 and Hoffa v. United States,108 
but they did so under the pre-Katz Fourth Amendment framework.  
 
Three years prior to Miller, the Court considered the issue in passing. In 
Couch v. United States, the Court ruled that financial information 
disclosed to an accountant—which would be provided to the IRS—
carried no reasonable expectation of privacy, but this issue was 
primarily considered in the context of the Fifth Amendment and 
property ownership.109 Miller, however, would more fully analyze the 
issue in the context of the Katz standard expressed under the Fourth 
Amendment.110 Three years after Miller, Smith would drastically expand 
the surveillance power of the government by expanding the scope of the 
third-party doctrine.111 
 
1. United States v. Miller: The Humble Beginnings of the Third-
Party Doctrine 
 
Miller involved defendant Mitchell Miller, who was convicted of 
operating a whiskey distillery without a license.112 During the 
investigation headed by the Treasury Department’s Alcohol, Tobacco, 





106 Accord Bellovin et al., supra note 5, at 5; see also Tokson, supra note 43, at 2106 (noting 
that third-party doctrine has been a contentious point of discussion among academics). 
107 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (regarding the attempted bribe of a tax official). The Court 
distinguished Lopez from Wong Sun, which was decided in the same year, on the grounds that 
the defendant in Lopez had consented to the official being in his home. Id. at 438.  
108 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (regarding verbal disclosures made to a government informant in a 
hotel room). The Court noted that a hotel room can be the subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection as much as a home or office but ruled that Hoffa did not have any privacy 
expectation with regards to the communications he gave to a government informant he 
willingly invited into that space. Id. at 301, 303.  
109 409 U.S. 322 (1973). Although primarily engaging in a Fifth Amendment analysis, the 
Court conducted a reasonable expectation of privacy test, finding “there can be little 
expectation of privacy where records are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory 
disclosure of much of the information therein is required in an income tax return.” Id. at 335. 
110 See Rebecca Lipman, Note, Third Party Exception: Reshaping an Imperfect Doctrine for 
the Digital Age, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 474 (2014).  
111 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979). 
112 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976). 
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microfilm records of defendant’s banking information.113 Miller 
asserted a Fourth Amendment defense, arguing that his private papers 
had been improperly seized and therefore could not be used as evidence 
against him.114 
 
The Court did not agree.115 Miller’s banking information was not 
considered to be “private papers” and did not require a warrant to be 
seized.116 The fact that the subpoenas were defective proved to be 
irrelevant.117 
 
Using the reasonable expectation of privacy standard expressed in Katz, 
as well as the principles first conceived in Jackson, the Court ruled that 
Miller had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of 
financial statements and deposit slips.118 The Court emphasized that 
banking documents seized were not confidential communications but 
instead business instruments used for commercial transactions.119 
Further, the documents were based on information voluntarily conveyed 
to the bank and exposed to its employees in the ordinary course of 
business.120 The depositor “takes the risk” that the information could be 
disclosed to the government.121 
 
The important takeaway from Miller, which would later be used in 
Carpenter, is that information tendered to a third party would not be 
protected if the information conveyed was voluntarily given, non-





113 Id. at 437-38. 
114 Id. at 438-39. 
115 Id. at 440. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 441. Since Miller had no Fourth Amendment protections and the bank had voluntarily 
disclosed Miller’s information, there was no requirement to subpoena the bank for records. Id. 
at 443. 
118 Id. at 442.  
119 Id. The bank itself disputed this characterization and indicated that the customer’s account 
information was considered by its customers to be confidential, which Justice Brennan 
highlighted in his dissent. Id. at 449 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 443.  
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employees.122 This specific, more concrete standard would erode as 
technology and the third-party doctrine developed, starting with 
Smith.123 
 
2. Smith v. Maryland: The Broadening of the Third-Party 
Doctrine 
 
While Miller dealt primarily with a search in the traditional context of 
seizing physical assets from a third party, Smith revolved around search 
and seizure as it related to government-surveillance. In March of 1976, 
a Baltimore resident by the name of Patricia McDonough was robbed.124 
After the robbery, McDonough received a series of threatening calls 
from an unknown man, who identified himself as the robber.125 
McDonough spoke to police who, without a warrant, requested that the 
telephone company install a pen register, which is a device that monitors 
the numbers dialed by telephone users.126 From this installation, the 
police discovered that Michael Lee Smith, a person who was already 
under suspicion, had placed a call to McDonough’s house.127 Using this 
discovery along with other evidence, the police arrested Smith, who was 
then identified by McDonough as the robber.128 At trial, Smith motioned 
to have “all fruits derived from the pen register” suppressed.129 
 
The Court denied Smith’s motion and stated that installation of the pen 
register was not a search.130 In distinguishing Smith from Katz, the Court 
stated that a pen register did not record the contents of 





122 Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth Amendment Limits of the 
Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1928 (2017) [hereinafter “If These Walls 
Could Talk”].  
123 Id. at 1929. 
124 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
125 Id.  
126 Id. A pen register will record where a phone places a call and the time the call is made. Id. 
at 736 n.1. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. Smith also happened to have a phone book containing McDonough’s number circled in 
it. Id.   
129 Id. at 737.  
130 Id. at 745-46.  
131 Id. at 741. 
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the Court in United States v. New York Telephone Co., which concerned 
the required procedures of the 1968 Wiretap Act and did not directly 
reach a Fourth Amendment question.132 Consequently, Smith 
represented the first time that the constitutionality of the pen register 
was directly challenged.  
 
In another first, the Court explicitly used Justice Harlan’s test expressed 
in Katz and determined that Smith had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the phone numbers he dialed.133 The Court argued that Smith 
must have realized that he “conveyed” the numbers he dialed to the 
telephone company.134 Crucial to the Court’s reasoning in this instance 
was the fact that telephone companies provided resources to customers 
that indicated numbering information was recorded, such as long-
distance call bills, telephone directories, and phone books, all of which 
allowed them to infer that call information was being recorded.135 
 
Citing Miller, the Court noted that Smith had assumed the risk of 
exposing his dialing information to the telephone company and 
analogized telephone company’s automated recording services as the 
metaphorical equivalent of a telephone operator that would take and 
redirect calls.136 The shift away from the original principles of Miller 
and Jackson was subtle but had a pronounced effect. By putting forth 
the idea that an automated register was the equivalent of a telephone 





132 434 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1977). Contents of communications enjoyed the full protection of 
the Fourth Amendment. See id. Third-party records obtained in connection with those 
communications (also known as “non-content”) did not. See id. at 168. 
133 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745. There is no indication that Smith actually knew that he had 
conveyed his phone dialing information to the telephone company. See id at 742.   
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 742-43. Justice Marshall expressed significant skepticism regarding this particular 
point, stating “I do not [assume] that individuals ‘typically know’ that a phone company 
monitors calls for internal reasons.” Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Further, Justice 
Marshall challenged the notion that even if an individual was aware, he or she did not expect 
the call information to be handed out to the public at large or the government. Id.  
136 Id. at 744-45 (majority opinion). The Court did not address the issue of whether 
communications given a telephone operator or subsequent records of a conversation kept by a 
telephone operator were subject to Fourth Amendment protections. See generally id. 
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the expectation of privacy: exposure to other people in the ordinary 
course of business.137 
 
The subtle change in meaning of the word “voluntary” as expressed 
under Miller when compared to how “voluntary” is used in Smith is also 
worth noting. In Miller, and other related cases prior to Miller, the 
information in question was knowingly and explicitly turned over to the 
third-party recipient.138 In Smith, the phone records were conveyed 
neither by the explicit intention of Smith, nor is it likely that he knew 
the phone company retained his dialing history.139 
 
Smith took the principles of Miller and analogized them to the 
surveillance context, which solidified the foundation of the third-party 
doctrine and modern surveillance law.140 The limited protections 
afforded to records kept by third parties from surveillance would be 
formally recognized in federal statute with the Pen/Trap provisions 
found in the 1983 Electronic Communications Privacy Act141 
(“ECPA”).142 The Pen/Trap provision provides a reduced standard for 
third-party records by requiring a court order through the ECPA or the 





137 Id. at 745; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). An important component of 
the Miller decision was that the information supplied to the bank’s staff needed to be viewed 
by the bank’s staff in order to properly input the information, an aspect which is not necessary 
for the information at bar in Smith. See id. The recording of dialed numbers was entirely 
autonomous and would not be exposed to the telephone operators in the ordinary course of 
business. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.  
138 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; see generally Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez 
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). 
139 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). The Smith Court believed that the 
majority of telephone users were aware that the telephone company recorded the numbers they 
dial. Id.  
140 If These Walls Could Talk, supra note 122, at 1929. The Smith Court created a more 
detailed analysis and clearer articulation of principles than the Court in Miller. See id.  
141 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508 §§ 3121-3126, 100 
Stat. 1848, 1868-1873 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127).  
142 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.  
143 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a). 
144 50 U.S.C. § 1801. FISA presents its own Fourth Amendment problems in the wake of 
overbroad data collection by the NSA, which caused a major scandal after Edward Snowden 
disclosed government surveillance methods to the public. See James F. McHugh, Book 
Review, 97 MASS. L. REV. 19, 20 (2015) (reviewing GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: 
EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014)). FISA provides a 




III. Modern Surveillance Laws and the Digital Technology: What to 
Do? 
 
The first and most obvious step in reforming the Fourth Amendment 
should be ending the third-party doctrine. Internet surveillance laws 
operate under the distinctions first established in Jackson, refined 
through Smith.145 Without delving into an in-depth explanation of how 
digital technology functions, suffice it to say that the bevy of data 
obtainable from records held by third parties from digital technologies 
vastly exceeds the scope of that contemplated in Smith or Miller.146 
 
A. Issues with the Third-Party Doctrine 
 
The nature of how individuals interact with their devices has drastically 
shifted from the era of the landline telephone. Cell phones and 
computers are often essential for certain types of activities, careers, 
financial management, social media, dating, hobbies, entertainment, and 
expression.147 Smart phone usage has exploded in popularity in the last 
decade, with eighty-one percent of Americans owning a smartphone in 
2018, compared to thirty-five percent in 2011; nearly every American 
owns a cell phone of some kind, and almost every American younger 






warrant exception to foreign targets of surveillance, and even if that surveillance obtains 
communications from an American citizen, there still is no warrant requirement. Wadie E. 
Said, Law Enforcement in the American Security State, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 819, 841 (2019).  
145 See Bellovin et al., supra note 5, at 3-4.  
146 Id. See id. at 52-91 for a more technical and comprehensive demonstration of the 
complexities of internet architectures.  
147 By September of 2019, Apple’s App Store had exceeded two million applications and 
generated more than $50 billion dollars in revenue in 2018 alone. Jack Nickas & Keith 
Collins, How Apple’s Apps Topped Rivals in the App Store It Controls, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 9, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/09/technology/apple-app-store-
competition.html [https://perma.cc/CUB7-S6XB]. 
148 Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR., (Jun. 12, 2019), https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/9P4J-SJWE]. Smartphone usage is least prevalent among 
individuals with an education level of less than a high school diploma and aged sixty-five or 
older. Id. Even among demographics least likely to have smartphones, ownership is above 
fifty percent for all demographics in America and has been trending upwards over the last 
decade. Id.  
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But even within the context of the relatively modest capabilities of the 
landline phone, the distinctions established by Jackson, the Wiretap Act, 
the ECPA, and Smith were ill-fitting.149 By the 1980s, telephone 
companies began conveying more than simply dialing information and 
began storing bank accounts, user accounts, and prescription 
numbers.150 Data sharing methods and data keeping by private 
corporations would only to continue to expand outward in volume, 
complexity, and the type from this point.151 
 
Can the principles of Jackson, grounded in the realities of the late 
nineteenth century postal system, be adapted to digital technology? 
Legal scholars disagree.152 Almost all scholars, however, recognize that 
the third-party doctrine at minimum needs to be rethought, if not 
abandoned in its entirety.153 
 
Even the ECPA itself seems to disregard this concept with Title II, 
known as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).154 As the name 
implies, the SCA regulates the handling of stored electronic content 
such as e-mail, voicemail, and messages stored for over 180 days.155 





149 See Bellovin et al., supra note 5, at 4 (noting that the competition offered by services 
competing with AT&T quickly altered the landscape of what was initially a relatively simple 
communication architecture).  
150 Id. Even at the time of Smith, companies were already utilizing more complex methods of 
landline communication that required the use of intermediaries to properly convey information 
needed for making certain types as calls, such as long-distance calls. See id.  
151 See id. at 5. IP-based communications, for example, rely on end-to-end communications, 
which are based in “dynamic” connections that depend on a wide range of underlying 
interworking networks in order to properly function. Id.  
152 Accord id; Tokson, supra note 43 (noting that there has been controversy of how traditional 
doctrine can be applied to digital technology).  
153 Accord Bellovin et al., supra note 5 (arguing for the abandonment of the doctrine); Tokson, 
supra note 43 (arguing for adding new factors to refine it). See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009), for a discussion on why the third-party 
doctrine should be retained without alteration. 
154 Stored Communications Act (SCA) § 201, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860, 1860-68 
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712). 
155 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). Records being seized under the SCA only require a court order which 
requires the government show “reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . records or other 
information . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” Id. § 2703(d).  
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protections and under normal circumstances require a warrant, only 
requires a subpoena or a court order if it has been stored for 180 days.156  
 
The arguments for the abolition of the third-party doctrine from a 
privacy perspective are twofold. First, the design of internet 
architecture, massive amounts of data exchanged, and use of predictive 
analytics can allow government actors to discern or infer private, 
potentially sensitive data that should enjoy privacy protections when 
observing third-party records. For example, a webpage which displays 
the result of a user’s search will transmit to a third party a URL that 
would allow a government actor to infer what the user was searching 
for.157 Comparing third-party data records to a traditional letter, it would 
be as if the contents of the letter were written on the outside of an 
envelope.158 
 
Second, third-party records may actually contain more sensitive and 
personal information than traditional communicative content itself.159 
Location data in particular has been the source of controversy, both in 
the Court with cases like Jones160 and Carpenter161 as well as in 
academia.162 As Justice Sotomayor expresses with her concurrence in 





156 See Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 463-64 (2008).  Cate highlights lower protection afforded to the stored 
communications under the SCA by comparing it to the relatively strong protections 
established under the Wiretap Act. Intercepting communications protected by the Wiretap Act 
requires a “super” search warrant which can only be sought be specially designated federal 
officials and has a litany of caveats to how the government intercept the communications and 
what information it can record. Id.  
157 Bellovin et al., supra note 5, at 70. For an example of how this specifically could apply to 
the field of predictive analytics, the retail outlet Target developed a system to predict when a 
woman was in the second trimester of her pregnancy by aggregating her shopping data. 




158 See Bellovin et al., supra note 5, at 71.  
159 Neil M. Richards & Jonathan King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 393 
(2014).  
160 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (regarding the collection of GPS data from 
a device attached to a suspect’s car). 
161 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
162 See generally Bellovin et al., supra note 5; Tokson, supra note 43. 
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location information can reveal intimate details about one’s life, such as 
“familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”163 
 
The overly broad nature of the third-party doctrine compounds these 
issues, with many critics decrying the “binary” nature of privacy, the 
lack of real agency for the person handing over the information, and the 
lack of knowledge of how that information will be handled.164 These 
critiques were first articulated by Justice Marshall and Justice Stewart 
in their dissents of Smith and have gained increased relevance as 
technology has developed in its capabilities.165 In an article criticizing 
the dissipation of Fourth Amendment protections in the digital age, 
Daniel J. Solove, a professor at George Washington Law School, writes, 
“[w]e are becoming a society of records, and these records are not held 
by us, but by third parties.”166 
 
Professor Solove’s words, written in 2002 and before the advent of the 
smart phone, have proven to be prophetic.167 With internet technology, 
an end-user’s information is often shared unknowingly, without his or 
her explicit consent.168 Due to the profit model of many websites, 





163 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).  
164 See Richards & King, supra note 159, at 396 (criticizing privacy as being treated similar to 
an “on-or-off” state); Bellovin et al., supra note 5, at 2. 
165 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748-52 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 746-48 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
166 Solove, supra note 9, at 1089. Solove further notes that “modern society demands” that 
individuals enter into a multiplicity of relationships that generate a multitude of personal 
records that are held by businesses. Id. The involuntary nature of this data collection required 
to participate in modern society would later influence the Court’s opinion in Carpenter. See 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
167 Solove, supra note 9, at 1089.   
168 See Richards & King, supra note 159, at 424. Richards further notes the dangers allowing 
continuous government into citizens’ private domains as strengthen a government’s ability to 
suppress speech and discriminate. Id.  
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user to use the platform.169 In turn, the data collected is sold to or 
monitored by other corporations.170 
 
Such arrangements, common as they are, impose serious difficulties for 
the continued practicality of the third-party doctrine in its current form. 
The expansive use of such doctrines allows government agencies such 
as the National Security Agency (“NSA”) to garner an unprecedented 
amount of data without a warrant.171 In 2018 alone, the NSA collected 
over 400 million call detail records from cell service providers, which is 
hardly the scale contemplated by Miller or Smith.172 
 
From a property-based perspective, the third-party doctrine has 
generally enjoyed less criticism. Not because the advocates of the 
property-based perspective universally subscribe to the notions 
established by the third-party doctrine, but because criticism has been 





169 See id. at 414. The exchange of information between companies is so widespread and so 
voluminous in nature that Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg famously stated, “the age of 
privacy is over.” Id. at 409; Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Says the Age of 
Privacy Is over, READWRITEWEB (Jan. 10, 2010), 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/external/readwriteweb/2010/01/10/10readwrit
eweb-facebooks-zuckerberg-says-the-age-of-privac-82963.html. 
170 Daniel Zwerdling, Your Digital Trail: Private Company Access, NPR, (Oct. 1, 2013, 2:00 
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/10/01/227776072/your-digital-
trail-private-company-access [https://perma.cc/XD69-PB4H]. For an example of how private 
corporations can obtain and sell potentially sensitive information about their users, dating 
applications, such as OKCupid, collect information about people’s drinking habits, drug use, 
sexual habits, race, religion, and other details which in turn is monitored by advertising and 
research firms that curate an online profile based on the data garnered from OKCupid. Id.  
171 Cate, supra note 156, at 436. 
172 UNITED STATES OFF. OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL 
TRANSPARENCY REPORT REGARDING THE USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES 30 (2018), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2019_ASTR_for_CY2018.pdf. 
173 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2235 (2018) (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
Justice Thomas opines that the reasonable expectation of privacy test expressed in Katz was 
wrong, and the principal inquiry to discussed is whether data is the property is owned by the 
individual or the third party that maintains it. Id. Justice Thomas concludes the analysis by 
stating that data is owned by the third party, not the individual being searched, therefore the 
data is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(conducting a similar analysis to Justice Thomas). Justice Alito, while preferring a property-
based perspective, seems to more willing to retain Katz, as he does not explicitly disapprove of 
its use and is willing to conduct a Katz analysis as long as it falls within the limits of the 
property-based perspective; he criticizes it as “broadening the [Fourth] Amendment’s reach.” 
See id. 
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traditional property-based perspective does not evaluate the privacy 
expectations of the individual—instead, it is only concerned with the 
object being seized and to whom it belongs.174 
 
Functionally, the third-party doctrine achieves the same result as the 
traditional property-based analysis, albeit for differing reasons.175 
However, in recent years, a new understanding of the property-based 
perspective has emerged. The new property-based perspective could 
integrate the privacy and property-based perspectives, but also extends 
Fourth Amendment protections to digital technology as well.176 
 
B. Can Carpenter Change Everything? 
 
The recent Carpenter case involved the Court’s latest effort to tackle the 
issues regarding the third-party doctrine. While Carpenter represents a 
step in the right direction, the Court has not gone far enough in fully 
abrogating the third-party doctrine. Nonetheless, Carpenter proves 
instructive in demonstrating the difficulties in creating a Fourth 
Amendment standard for digital data. 
 
Timothy Carpenter had been named as an accomplice in a series of 
armed robberies of Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores in Michigan and 





174 See id (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito also places comparatively more weight on the 
distinction between an “order” and a “search” than the other two property-based Justices. See 
id. In Justice Alito’s words, an order only requires a party to look through its own records and 
provide a document, whereas a search involves the dispatching of law enforcement to enter 
private premises to seize private effects; an order does not invoke the Fourth Amendment at 
all, whereas a search does. Id.  
175 From the perspective of the third-party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment does not apply 
because it the individual being searched has a reduced privacy interest in the third-party 
records because they are held by a third party. From the traditional property-based perspective, 
the Fourth Amendment does not apply because the data being searched by the government 
belongs to third party; expectation of privacy is not a relevant interest. The result is the same 
regardless of which perspective: the data does not enjoy Fourth Amendment protections.  
176 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting). Breaking from his peers, Justice 
Gorsuch states that certain property interests may be found in digital data that is held by third 
parties through the concept of bailment and suggests categorizing such data as part of one’s 
“effects” under the Fourth Amendment. Id. Further, Justice Gorsuch asserts that people have 
“substantial legal interests” in their digital data. Id. at 2272. 
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number over to the FBI.177 The FBI applied for court orders under the 
SCA to obtain the call records of Carpenter, seeking 152 days of CSLI 
from MetroPCS as well as seven days from Sprint.178 The data 
confirmed that Carpenter’s phone was at the location of the four 
robberies at the same time and the same day as the robbery occurred.179 
On the basis of this evidence, Carpenter was convicted and sentenced to 
over 100 years in prison.180 Carpenter appealed on Fourth Amendment 
grounds because the CSLI had been obtained without a warrant 
supported by probable cause.181 
 
The Court agreed.182 Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, stated that 
given the revealing and automatic nature of CSLI data collection, the 
acquisition of the data was a search under the Fourth Amendment.183 
The ruling was narrowly tailored, with Justice Roberts explicitly stating 
that the ruling only applied to the context of CSLI—Smith and Miller 
were not be disturbed, and the rule was not intended to question 
conventional surveillance techniques or tools.184 Nonetheless, there has 
been a debate on how “narrow” this narrow decision is in reality.185 
 
Much of Robert’s opinion is dedicated to how the circumstances of 
CSLI tracking qualitatively differ from the phone records and banking 
information seized in Smith and Miller.186 The Court, invoking Katz and 





177 Id. at 2212 (majority opinion). 
178 Id. 
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 2213. 
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 2223. 
183 Id. However, Justice Roberts acknowledges that this is not a categorical warrant 
requirement for the search of CSLI and known exceptions to warrant requirements, such as the 
exigent circumstances exception, still apply. Id. at 2222.  
184 Id. at 2220. Justice Roberts further notes that warrants will only be required in the “rare 
case” where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in the third-party records. Id. at 2222.  
185 See, e.g., Kyllie Mae Guidry, Carpenter v. United States: A Step Further in Privacy 
Protection, but Not Far Enough, 46 S. UNIV. L. REV. 260 (2019); Ohm, supra note 19; Burrus 
& Knight, supra note 19; Mezera, supra note 19. The general impression of most academics is 
that Carpenter has significantly affected the future applicability of the third-party doctrine, 
despite being characterized as a “narrow” holding. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 19.  
186 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-19. Justice Roberts is particularly concerned about the 
differences between the nature of the data collected in aggregate. See id.  
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has a reasonable expectation of privacy as to his or her physical 
location.187 Invoking Miller and Smith, Justice Roberts argued that 
Carpenter did not share his information voluntarily, as cell phone use is 
essentially a necessity in today’s society that could not in any 
meaningful way “assume the risk” of turning over CSLI to third 
parties.188 Additionally, the Court noted that the third-party doctrine did 
not anticipate the “world of difference between the limited types of 
personal information . . . and the exhaustive chronicle of location 
information casually collected by wireless carriers today.”189 From 
Robert’s perspective, using the third-party doctrine to obtain 
information such as CSLI would be impermissibly extending the scope 
of the third-party doctrine outside its intended function.190 But does that 
logic hold water?  
 
C. The New Carpenter Test?  
 
Despite Robert’s repeated insistence to the contrary, Carpenter 
significantly alters the third-party doctrine and the interpretation of 
Smith and Miller.191 The logic underlying the decision in Carpenter can 
easily be transposed to other emerging technologies which present novel 
methods of undermining privacy. Some commenters have gone as far as 
to say that Carpenter implicitly creates an entirely new test.192 
 
Paul Ohm, a professor at Georgetown University, notes that the critical 
factors of the Carpenter analysis include the (1) “deeply revealing 
nature” of the information; (2) its breadth, depth, and comprehensive 
reach, and (3) the automated and unescapable collection of data.193 Ohm 
posits that when lower courts attempt to apply this new “test” 
established under Carpenter, many databases that have never required a 






187 Id. at 2218. 
188 Id. at 2220. 
189 Id. at 2219. 
190 Id.  
191 Ohm, supra note 19, at 358. 
192 Id. at 361. 
193 Id.  
194 Id.  
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Ohm characterizes the rejection by Chief Justice Roberts to use existing 
precedent as “tech exceptionalism,” which stands for the premise that 
advances in information technology create novel circumstances that 
have not been addressed by existing precedent and attempting to 
analogize previous precedent with new technology is inappropriate.195 
For example, “tech exceptionalism” would reject the idea that a pen 
register can be directly compared to a telephone operator, as the Court 
did in Smith.196 
 
This approach, while on its face is seemingly a practical escape route 
for the Court, has several problems—the first and foremost being that it 
provides no real guidance to ensure consistency in future cases. 
Consequently, the approach will lead to inconsistent results and 
applications. While Carpenter admits that there are exceptions to the 
third-party doctrine, it does not provide any sort of method to categorize 
or define those exceptions. Justice Roberts merely calls it a “different 
species of business records.”197 Instead of using the paradigm of 
communicative content versus records held by third parties, the Court 
now suggests there may be a third category of information that lacks any 
definite meaning. Moreover, it does nothing to prevent the lower courts 
from acrimoniously applying the rule from Smith to new technology; it 
only gives them the option to elect to disregard Smith if they so choose. 
Yet, the possibility to remedy this shortcoming may be found in the most 
unlikely of places: the property-based perspective. 
 
IV. The Future of the Fourth Amendment 
 
Carpenter remains an incomplete solution to deal with Fourth 
Amendment treatment of digital data. While some commenters have 
considered Carpenter to be a revolutionary expansion of the Fourth 
Amendment, it has left others unsatisfied both from a doctrinal 





195 Id. at 360. 
196 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).  
197 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018). 
198 See Guidry, supra note 185; Burrus & Knight, supra note 19. Among the chief criticisms of 
Carpenter is that the framework does not do enough properly advocate privacy interests (from 
the perspective of privacy advocates) and does not provide a sufficient or principled 
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by Carpenter have turned to Justice Gorsuch’s dissent,199 which calls 
for the abandonment of the reasonable expectation of privacy test from 
Katz and expansively redefines the property perspective to be digital 
data inclusive.200 Combining Gorsuch’s expansive property perspective 
with the new Carpenter privacy perspective may resolve the numerous 
problems with digital data and the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Justice Gorsuch proposed that the legal concept of bailment be used to 
address the issue of third-parties and digital data.201 Invoking Jackson, 
Justice Gorsuch argued that digital data are the modern equivalent of 
“papers and effects” entrusted to a third party.202 A bailee owes a legal 
duty to keep an item safe for the bailor; Justice Gorsuch claims that this 
can be analogized modern data keeping.203 By considering data as one’s 
“papers and effects,” the Fourth Amendment interest can be maintained 






framework to enumerating Fourth Amendment rights based in the language of the Amendment 
(from the property-based perspective). Id. Justice Gorsuch specifically critiques the holding in 
Carpenter as creating “two amorphous balancing tests, a series of weighty and 
incommensurable principles to consider in them, and few illustrative examples that seem little 
more than the product of judicial intuition.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting).   
199 Burrus & Knight, supra note 19, at 82. Although Justice Gorsuch’s dissent was not joined 
by any of the other dissenting Justices (Thomas, Kennedy, or Alito), his perspective on the 
property based Fourth Amendment has gained traction with certain academics who advocate 
for that perspective. See generally id.; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206. 
200 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268-70 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch’s main critique 
of Katz comes from its “often unpredictable—and sometimes unbelievable—jurisprudence.” 
Id. at 2266.  
201 Burrus & Knight, supra note 19, at 97. Worth noting, however, is Justice Gorsuch’s 
apparent willingness to retain Katz to some degree, as he admits in Carpenter that there are 
“some occasions where Katz is capable of a principled application.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 
2265 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch further suggests that a “principled application” 
of Katz would result in the same conclusion as a “more traditional option.” Id. at 2266.  
202 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2269 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
203 Id. at 2269-71. Justice Gorsuch does not express a definitive opinion on if there is a 
proprietary interest metadata generated in response to user “lending” of information, or how 
many steps removed from a particular user input could potentially terminate a user’s property 
interest.  
204 Id. Justice Gorsuch highlights that complete ownership or exclusive property control is not 
a necessary condition to enjoy a Fourth Amendment right. See id. at 2269. For example, 
tenants that reside in a rental property still enjoy Fourth Amendment protection of their living 
area even though they do not own the property itself. Id. at 2269-70.  
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The European Union has done something similar with its General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).205 The legislation is intended to 
protect the rights of consumers by affording them a limited ownership 
and set of rights to their data collected by third parties.206 The need for 
the GDPR reflects the chicken or the egg problem that results from the 
creation and categorization of new technology: Does the legislation 
exist because the end-user already has property interests in their digital 
data and therefore needs to be protected as such, or does the GDPR 
create a new, statutorily defined expansion of property interests? For 
Justice Gorsuch, the answer is the former. 
 
Should the Fourth Amendment head toward solely a property regime? 
The drawbacks to the property analogy have already been expressed by 
Ohm with the concept of “tech exceptionalism.”207 Analogizing old 
principles to new and novel technology leads to the decisions such as 
Smith, so if the goal is preventing another Smith, Justice Gorsuch’s 
suggestion to treat data as analogous to bailment has similar 
shortcomings.208 Additionally, the property-based standard still has the 
shortcomings of Katz that it purports to solve, which are ambiguity in 
differentiating between different species of property and deciding on a 
coherent calculus that balances the individual’s right to their “papers and 






205 Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR]. The GDPR 
provides several restrictions on the handling of data between public and private entities, as 
well as violations for noncompliance. See id.  
206 See Jacob M. Victor, The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Toward a Property 
Regime for Protecting Data Privacy, 123 YALE L.J. 513 (2013). Most notably, the GDPR 
attempts to establish a “right to be forgotten” that entitles an end user to order the deletion of 
records held by third parties that contain that end user’s data. Id. at 513-14. However, this 
“right to be forgotten” does not merely extend to the third party that creates or keeps the 
records, but all third parties with whom the information has been shared or sold. Id. at 514. 
207 Ohm, supra note 19, at 360, 400-02. Ohm speculates that lawyers and legal scholars in 
particular are vulnerable to making erroneous conclusions based on analogies because they are 
“non-experts who cannot understand the failure of a given analogy because they cannot 
accurately characterize Y or compare it to X when complicated analogy in involved.” Id. at 
407. To accommodate for this shortcoming, Ohm suggests employing “sophisticated 
technological support” and emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary training. Id.  
208 See id. at 406-08. In particular, Ohm highlights that technology such as the smart phone 
have no historical analogy and speculates that Justice Roberts considers the contents of a smart 
phone to have a stronger privacy interest than the traditionally protected home. Id. at 403. 
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Alone, the concept of bailment applied to digital property provides only 
limited use. But reading Justice Gorsuch’s dissent as a critique of the 
current Katz standard demonstrates a potential compromise between a 
privacy-based “tech exceptionalism” and Justice Gorsuch’s desire for a 
stronger Fourth Amendment based in property-principles. While the 
privacy and property-based perspectives differ on the methodology, 
proponents of both the Gorsuch property perspective and privacy 
advocates agree on not only the problem, but also the result: Katz and 
Smith create too many issues.209  Further, and perhaps even more 
importantly, they agree Fourth Amendment protections need to include 
digital data and that current measures are inadequate.210 The unification 
of goals and common grievances make a bipartisan Fourth Amendment 
possible.  
 
A. “Public-Facing” Data and Presumption of “Tech 
Exceptionalism” 
 
The problem inherent in both Roberts’s “tech exceptionalism” and 
Justice Gorsuch’s property-based standard is that both doctrines fail to 
adequately account for unexpected societal changes associated with the 
development of new technology. Roberts’s tech exceptionalism is a 
purely reactive set of limitations to an overly exclusive doctrine and still 





209 Compare id. at 416 (stating the Fourth Amendment has failed to properly account for the 
harms that can be wrought with new technology), with Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261-62, 2272 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (criticizing current precedent as “doing nothing to limit investigators 
from searching your records you’ve entrusted to your bank, accountant, and maybe even your 
doctor” and suggesting that a constitutional floor may be necessary to bar efforts to 
circumvent Fourth Amendment protections with a subpoena).  
210 Compare Bellovin et al., supra note 5 at 91-92 (criticizing Katz and Smith as being too 
difficult to apply and leading to inconsistent and anomalous results), with Carpenter, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2266 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (leveling the exact same criticism of Katz and Smith).  
211 Although Ohm advocates for a more expert-integrated approach concurrent with “tech 
exceptionalism,” it is important to consider the current reality of the legal system with regards 
to the technological literacy of most judges and magistrates approving court orders, a fact 
highlighted by Justice Gorsuch in his dissent in Carpenter. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2265 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (stating that Federal judges are often ill-equipped to make such 
decisions). Important to consider is the fact that the average age of an Article III Judge is 
around sixty-five years and continues to increase every year. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
Demography of Article III Judges, 1789-2017, https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-
and-maps/age-and-experience-judges#_ftn7  [https://perma.cc/DS9H-8WE4]. Consequently, it 
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property-based standard fails to grasp the multitude of relationships an 
individual can have with their data.212 
 
For an illustration of both doctrines’ respective shortcomings, one 
would only need to look at how applications function in the modern 
world. A person in today’s society may knowingly and voluntarily 
tender location information to the dating app Tinder213 but nonetheless 
be perturbed by the notion that the government can seamlessly access 
and aggregate that information without a warrant.214 Similarly, it would 
be hard to argue that the association created by a Tinder “match” could 
be conceived as property or having a property interest in a 
straightforward, traditional manner, but it would generally be 
considered invasive for the government to monitor who matches with 
whom. 
 
In both above hypotheticals, the expectation of privacy should be broken 
by the government intruding in a sphere where the information in 
question would not be available to another end-user of the platform. Put 
differently, the data is not “public-facing.” Tinder users cannot view the 





is desirable to have clearly defined rules or principles that make it easier for a judge that may 
not have a strong background in technology to make a decision, and not merely defer to the 
opinion of an expert.  
212 Justice Gorsuch’s perspective is problematic when applied to the concept of predictive 
analytics or third-party records generated in response to or from user input data. For example, 
if a company compiles a user’s data and assigns labels to certain users based on a set criterion, 
would the user have any property interest in that record if the company’s categorization would 
reveal the underlying data it used to make a judgment? Retaining the Katz/Carpenter privacy 
principles allows for malleability in fringe cases and for unpredictable advances in 
technological development that may not be covered under the bailment concept.  
213 Given the volatile nature of technological progress, applications like Tinder may become 
out of date, unsupported, or otherwise no longer used in the near future. The use of examples 
in this Note are intended to illustrate clearly articulable principles for classifying and 
analyzing various species of data moving into the future without limiting the analysis to the 
current technological paradigm or existing platforms.  
214 See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists for location data given to a third party for that third party’s use, but only if that data is 
collected automatically without one’s knowledge). 
215 Marie Black, How to Use Tinder, TECH ADVISOR, (Apr. 29, 2019) 
https://www.techadvisor.co.uk/feature/software/tinder-3515013/ [https://perma.cc/5DC2-
8397].  
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Tinder sells that information to other corporations as part of its profit 
model, but that data is not publicly available.216 
 
Under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, the end-user and 
society should have a privacy expectation regarding data not viewable 
by the public because for all intents and purposes, the data is not seen or 
expected to be seen by anyone.217 However, Katz has not been 
historically applied in that manner.218 
 
By contrast, a Tinder user may expect that his or her profile pictures, 
description, and general whereabouts may be ascertained by other users, 
as the end-user deliberately places that information in a place where it 
can be viewed. The purpose of the data is to be seen by others. Put 
another way, those types of data are “public-facing.” 
 
The concept of “public-facing” data is as old as Jackson itself. When 
Jackson sent his lottery flier that could be viewed by anyone without 
any additional inspection, he forfeited his Fourth Amendment interest 





216 Judith Duportail, I Asked Tinder for My Data. It Sent Me 800 Pages of My Deepest, 
Darkest Secrets, GUARDIAN, (Sept. 26, 2017, 2:10 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/26/tinder-personal-data-dating-app-
messages-hacked-sold [https://perma.cc/BV7B-NFVT]. The types of data Tinder has stored 
behind closed doors include: every location where a message is sent from with timestamps, 
age range of partners, education level of the user, occupation, and tastes in food. Id. In Europe, 
the data compiled by Tinder is statutorily required to be accessible to the end user when 
requested, but no such mechanism exists in the United States. Id.  
217 Justice Marshall suggests that this is the proper formulation of the Katz inquiry in his 
dissent in Smith.  
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall 
further criticizes the idea that professional or personal necessities such as phone calls requires 
the “assuming” of risk of surveillance. Id. at 750.  
218 See id. One of the primary critiques of Katz from both advocates of the privacy and 
property-based perspective is the inconsistency in its application. See generally, Bellovin et 
al., supra note 5; Burrus & Knight, supra note 19. For a discussion on how the concept of 
“knowing exposure” has been evaluated under the Katz framework, see Sherry F. Colb, What 
Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of 
Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002) (discussing the doctrinal flaws of the Fourth 
Amendment in a variety of circumstances including trash collection, flights, and tracking 
devices). 
219 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.727, 733 (1877). By contrast, if Jackson had decided to conceal 
the contents of his letter with an envelope, thus keeping it safe from public inspection, the 
government would have had to obtain a warrant to inspect it. See id. The primary principle 
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as the “outward weight and form” in Jackson.220 The same principles 
can be applied to modern data collection by the government. 
 
B. Tipping the Scale in Favor of the Protection 
 
Instead of the Court’s broad approach to allowing government 
collection of data except that what is exceptional—such as CSLI—the 
paradigm should be reversed. The prevailing presumption should 
disallow the collection of data except that which can be safely described 
as having minimal privacy interests.221 In other words, the Fourth 
Amendment should safeguard people’s information as long as it is not 
“public-facing.” What constitutes “public-facing” in the digital 
technology context is data that can be openly and easily accessed by an 
ordinary end-user or information put on public display for the purposes 
of others’ use on the platform. 
 
This paradigm can be justified under Justice Gorsuch’s property 
perspective as well. Information that is given to a third party for the 
purpose of public display creates a distinctive property relationship 
between the two parties that can be separated from information that is 
provided for the purposes of record keeping or required to operate the 





expressed by Jackson is that the government need not blind itself to something that is on 
public display merely because it is another person’s “papers” under the Fourth Amendment. 
See id.  
220 Id. The wording of “outward weight and form” is meant to indicate the physical appearance 
and weight of the parcel easily observed without inspection. See id.  
221 In other words, data meant for public consumption or that is otherwise easily publicly 
viewable. This integrates the privacy principle Justice Marshall expressed in Smith and 
analogizes it to the digital sphere. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 749.  
222 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2268-70 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Gorsuch uses an analogy comparing an intrusion of a tenant or resident family members who 
technically do not own the property to digital data to illustrate that merely because the 
individual does not have a legal title or ownership to the property, it does not eliminate their 
Fourth Amendment interests. Id. However, “public facing” data can be contrasted with record 
data on two grounds: (1) the purpose for which the data is being conveyed and (2) who the 
recipient of the data is. Essentially, the data in question that is “public facing” can be 
considered data that is given to the public at large and therefore terminates the proprietary 
interest of the information, whereas record data is a bailment provided to a company in 
exchange to use a service. The analysis is intended to avoid creating complex normative 
questions for the Court to decide regarding the subjective expectations of the end user and 
discourage the use of analogies.  
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are meant to be used and consumed by the public, much like how one 
takes out an advertisement on a billboard. The third party in this 
situation is merely the middleman to provide the individual’s “effects” 
to the public. By contrast, data that is provided to a bailor as a condition 
to access a platform, or otherwise for the purposes of utilizing some sort 
of service retains the traditional bailee-bailor relationship wherein the 
bailee’s interest in the property remains.223 
 
It is clear that the third-party doctrine as defined under Smith and Miller 
is buckling under the weight of its own impracticality and the 
restrictions set forth by Carpenter.224 The act of surrendering certain 
information to a third party should not terminate an individual’s privacy 
or property interest in that information. While there are some instances 
where a privacy or property interest can terminate through voluntarily 
and explicitly surrendering the information to third parties with the 
knowledge that it will be viewed by others, as in Miller and Jackson, the 
vast majority of data turned over to third parties do not share those clear-
cut circumstances.225 As Justice Marshall wrote in his dissent of Smith, 
privacy should not be treated like an on/off switch.226 
 
Consequently, the new paradigm should be predictive rather than 
reactive. Justice Brandeis was rightfully concerned about technology’s 
ability to undermine the Fourth Amendment interests of the individual 
in his Olmstead dissent, but the Court has not crafted any safeguards to 





223 Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch also notes that data required to operate 
technology which is “functionally compelled by the demands of modern life” may be 
considered to be a type of “involuntary bailment.” Id. Justice Gorsuch’s concerns echo Justice 
Marshall’s original critique of Smith. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(expressing skepticism that people realistically have a choice when “choosing” to use 
telephone technology).  
224 See generally Ohm, supra note 19; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261-70 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). Despite being supposedly on opposite ends of an ideological spectrum, both Ohm 
and Justice Gorsuch share the same critiques of Smith and Katz. Compare Ohm, supra note 19, 
with Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261-70 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
225 See generally Richards  
& King, supra note 159. The vast majority of information collected about a user in the digital 
sphere is done so without the user’s explicit knowledge or consent. Id.  
226 Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall posits that privacy should 
follow more of a spectrum, as certain species of data can be more or less sensitive than others. 
Id.  
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government can collect any information or use any means that it is not 
explicitly forbidden from using.227 This is not a desirable outcome.228 
 
The scales need to be tipped in favor of the individual, as opposed to the 
government. To update the Fourth Amendment, the Court needs to 
recognize this fact, disregard the third-party doctrine as it applies to 
digital data, and create precedent that allows for a presumption that 
favors the individual over the government.229 The concept of “public-
facing” data allows for such a protection. By creating a clearer and 
stricter standard of scrutiny for government surveillance, the Court 
would head off problems of emerging technology circumventing Fourth 
Amendment protections through increasingly creative data collection 
and aggregation methods.230 Only through anticipatory—not 
reactionary—doctrines can the Court protect the Fourth Amendment 
rights of Americans in the digital age. 
 
C. The Bipartisan Fourth Amendment: Combining 
Property and Privacy Perspectives  
 
The current status of the Fourth Amendment remains in flux. The lack 
of tangible and easily understood principles expressed in Carpenter 
creates difficulties for conducting a meaningful Fourth Amendment 
analysis in the realm of digital technology. Consequently, the rulings by 





227 See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206. 
228 For an in-depth discussion on the consequences of unregulated government data mining, 
see Cate, supra note 152 (highlighting the lack of statutory protection and a general 
unwillingness for the government to engage in self-regulation of its own surveillance 
activities).  
229 A possible method for facilitating this would be eliminating the presumption of reduced 
privacy interest in data held by third parties and instead invoking a rebuttal presumption of 
data protection. Creating a rebuttal presumption would combat a judge’s willingness to defer 
to government’s experts and request, instead requiring the judge to critically evaluating the 
principles at stake before allowing a surveillance order.  
230 Another potential benefit would be giving the lower courts a clear directive and avoiding 
complicated inquiries into the precise functionality of any particular application. As noted 
before and expressed by Justice Gorsuch, courts generally are not adept at making judgments 
on technological privacy issues. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2265 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(“[P]olitically insulated judges come armed only with attorneys’ briefs, a few law clerks, and 
their own idiosyncratic experiences . . . hardly the representative group you’d expect (or want) 
making empirical judgments for hundreds of millions of people.”).  
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analysis can be articulated. Nonetheless, there is a general agreement 
among a majority of the Court that digital data deserves Fourth 
Amendment protections, but disagreements about how the doctrines 
should be handled.231 Integrating aspects from Justice Gorsuch’s 
property-based perspective into the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test may alleviate these issues. 
 
Accepting Justice Gorsuch’s conclusion that end-users have still 
retained property interests in their digital data shared or generated by 
third parties, digital data should be presumed to be protectable. The 
user’s Fourth Amendment interests do not terminate merely because it 
is given to a third party, as the user still retains a proprietary interest in 
it. As many Justices supporting the property-based perspective have 
noted, Katz did not abridge the blanket Fourth Amendment protection 
to a person’s papers and effects.232 Nonetheless, the Katz analysis, 
particularly under Smith and Miller has moved away from this 
constitutional “floor” for protection and often cuts against it. 
 
The focus of a combined privacy-property analysis should be: For what 
purpose is the user’s data being “lent” to the third party? Are the data 
collected necessary to use the platform in question are they placed on 
display for the public (“public facing”)? The strength of the property 
(i.e., the extent to which the records in question can be characterized as 
a person’s “effects”) and privacy interest (i.e., the extent to which a 
person expects that property to be “private”) should inform whether the 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists. 
 
For an example of how this combined analysis could work, consider 
again the example of Tinder. To use Tinder, an end-user must input their 





231 Id. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Carpenter can be read as functionally similar to a 
concurrence rather than a dissent, because he appears to agree with the result achieved by the 
Court, but not the methodology.  
232 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 947 (2012) (noting that “Katz did not 
repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for 
government trespass upon the areas it enumerates”); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2267 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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profiles.233 In essence, the “effect” being supplied to Tinder by swiping 
is the information the user provides about his or her dating preferences; 
Tinder merely acts as a middleman to allow the user to match with 
another end-user.234 
 
Since there is an “effect” being supplied to Tinder in the form of tangible 
data, the constitutional posture for the Fourth Amendment should favor 
protection. But the inquiry need not stop there. The follow-up should be: 
What is the function of the bailment? Is the purpose of the “effect” being 
supplied to be viewed by the public? 
 
In the case of Tinder swipes, the answer would be no. Tinder does not 
alert the public at large about an individual’s swiping habits.235 The only 
time an end-user’s swipe is revealed is either through a “super like” 
which indicates to a specific user that he or she has “super-liked” them 
in order to increase his or her profile visibility to that specific user, or 
when two users have independently swiped to match with one 
another.236 Given the limited purpose for which the information was 
“lent” to Tinder, and the limited dissemination of the information in 
question, the contents of one’s Tinder swiping habits should enjoy 





233 Marie Black, How to Use Tinder, TECH ADVISOR, (Apr. 29, 2019) 
https://www.techadvisor.co.uk/feature/software/tinder-3515013/ [https://perma.cc/CHN6-
T5EN]. 
234 Id. Tinder also has an opt-in algorithm to help a user assess profile favorability to better 
facilitate the matching process, which can dictate how a user’s information is displayed on 
their profile without consulting the user, as well as other features that otherwise provide 
automated assistance in assisting profile visibility. Id. For the purposes of this analysis, 
however, bonus opt-in features such as paid subscriptions or methods to boost profile visibility 
will not be discussed.  
235 Id. Tinder, however, does keep records of this information to better generate possible 
matching profiles for individuals that use the platform. Id.  
236 Id. Even so though the information of a “match” or “super-like” is transmitted to another 
user, it is not handed out to the public at large. See id.  
237 For a more complex illustration of the same principles at work, consider the issue of 
location data with regards to Tinder. In order to use the platform, Tinder requires the use of 
location data, and that data is displayed publicly for other users to evaluate their location 
relative to the profile they are viewing. Such data, despite being one’s effects, would not enjoy 
Fourth Amendment protections, as it is publicly viewable and carries with it no expectation of 
privacy. There is a reduced property interest as well, as the user voluntarily surrenders that 
“effect” to the public at large. However, precise location data of the user generated over a long 






By integrating the notions of Justice Gorsuch’s broader property-based 
regime into the Carpenter privacy-oriented extension of the Katz test, 
the test can become less opaque, easier to apply, and more objective. 
Additionally, it furthers the goals of privacy advocates by providing a 
blanket protection that must be overcome in order to protect new species 
of data, rather than asking a normative question of how society at large 
tends to view such data (a function that most courts are ill-equipped to 
accomplish). This would prevent the Court from having to decide a 
purely normative question to determine whether each and every new 
technology deserves privacy protection. 
 
In a sense, everyone wins: those who have a property-based perspective 
of the Fourth Amendment have their preferred ideological framework 
as the baseline for the Fourth Amendment, and those with the Katz 
perspective are able to retain a flexible, privacy-oriented test. 
 
Allowing for a more “principled” application of Katz and Carpenter 
would diminish potential critiques stating that its basis is not found in 
the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, it would eliminate the lower 
courts from reaching abnormal, unexpected results that arise from the 
application of Katz.238 
 
The solution will not work for everyone, however. More originalist 
Justices such as Thomas or Alito likely will resist the categorization of 
digital data as property and maintain their stated positions as expressed 
in Carpenter. Nonetheless, the involvement of such Justices is not 





period of time, which would otherwise be unavailable for consumption to a typical Tinder 
end-user, likely would enjoy Fourth Amendment protections.  
238 Operating under the assumption that Carpenter creates a new test, the integrated 
Katz/Carpenter test would retain the same benefits.  
239 With Justice Gorsuch’s vote, the Court could form a strong five-person coalition of Justices 
Roberts, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. While it is not currently known what Justice 
Kavanaugh or Barrett’s opinion will be on these issues, the effort to craft an ideologically 
bipartisan Fourth Amendment may be enough to garner their vote as well, making the total 7-
2.  
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apparent based on their prior rulings that they will not be convinced to 
adopt a more data protective Fourth Amendment.240 
 
A synthesis between the property-based perspective and the privacy 
perspective would not only have the effect of improving the Katz test, 
but actively protect data interests. Further, it would allow for a bipartisan 
recognition of principles and ideals, which would be desirable for 
continued doctrinal consistency of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 






240 See generally United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (Justices Alito and 
Thomas refusing to categorize data as a person’s “effects” for a Fourth Amendment analysis). 
Justice Alito in particular gave a scathing critique of the majority’s holding in Carpenter, 
predicting that the Court will face “embarrassment” of explaining a “crazy quilt of the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
